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A B S T R A C T
Every scientific technique features some error, and legal standards for the admissibility of scientific
evidence (e.g., Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993; Kumho Tire Co v. Carmichael, 1999) guide
trial courts to consider known error rates. However, recent reviews of forensic science conclude that error
rates for some common techniques are not well-documented or even established (e.g., NAS, 2009; PCAST,
2016). Furthermore, many forensic analysts have historically denied the presence of error in their field.
Therefore, it is important to establish what forensic scientists actually know or believe about errors rates
in their disciplines. We surveyed 183 practicing forensic analysts to examine what they think and
estimate about error rates in their various disciplines. Results revealed that analysts perceive all types of
errors to be rare, with false positive errors even more rare than false negatives. Likewise, analysts
typically reported that they prefer to minimize the risk of false positives over false negatives. Most
analysts could not specify where error rates for their discipline were documented or published. Their
estimates of error in their fields were widely divergent – with some estimates unrealistically low.
All scientific procedures inevitably involve some error, particu-
larly when the procedures rely on subjective human judgment.
Understanding the nature and extent of error is crucial to
understanding the meaning of any particular piece of scientific
evidence. Thus, most scientific disciplines work to document the
reliability (i.e., consistency, reproducibility) and validity (i.e.,
accuracy) of their scientific procedures.
For scientific evidence to be admitted in court, data regarding
reliability and validity are crucial. In the United States, landmark
Supreme Court decisions Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. [1] and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael [2], direct federal trial
courts (and state trial courts that adopted this framework) to
evaluate whether “an expert's testimony pertain[s] to ‘scientific
knowledge”’ as articulated in the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ([1],
p. 590). The Daubert Court acknowledged that many factors
are relevant in determining whether evidence derived from a
particular technique qualifies as “scientific knowledge,” but offered
criteria that courts could consider. One enumerated criterion is the
“known or potential rate of error” (p. 594).
Error rates are a crucial component in assessing the reliability
and validity of a method purporting to produce scientific findings.
A fact-finder's ability to properly interpret the conclusions of any
scientific analysis depends upon the ability to know the chance
that an error occurred. And, although the discussion above
concerns admissibility criteria in the United States, other countries
have similar guidelines for admitting scientific evidence [5,6].
Errors are especially important in the criminal justice system
because they are not isolated within an investigation. Indeed, they
often cascade and snowball to influence numerous other aspects of
the investigative and legal proceedings [7].
1. What do we know about error rates in forensic science?
What do we know about reliability and error rates of popular
forensic science techniques admitted in court? Historically, many
forensic scientists adamantly denied that there are any errors in
their field (e.g., [8,9]). In a well-known example, in 2004, the
FBI laboratory supported their “conclusion of a 100% positive
identification” that Brandon Mayfield was the source of latent
prints implicating him as the Madrid train bomber [10]. However,
this identification by multiple FBI latent fingerprint experts was
erroneous [11]. Landmark reviews (e.g., National Academy of
Sciences [3] and President's Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology [PCAST] [4]) have since noted that such statements
implying 100% certainty in forensic conclusions are not scientifi-
cally defensible. Other reviews have documented that errors
in forensic science analyses clearly exist and have significant
* Corresponding author at: Institute of Law, Psychiatry, and Public Policy,
University of Virginia, Box 800660, Charlottesville, VA 22908, United States.
E-mail address: Murrie@virginia.edu (D.C. Murrie).
consequences. For example, a review of DNA exoneration cases
found that 63% of erroneous guilty verdicts were caused, in part, by
forensic science testing errors [9]. But acknowledging that errors
occur is not the same as documenting rates of error, or reliability of
techniques.
Indeed, a primary critique from the 2009 National Academy of
Sciences [NAS] report was that the field of forensic science must
better study, document, and acknowledge the reliability (including
error rates) of forensic science techniques. Specifically, the report
noted that “wide variability is found across forensic science
disciplines not only with regard to techniques and methodologies,
but also with regard to reliability, error rates, reporting, research
foundations, general acceptability, and published material”
(p. 188). Thus, the authors concluded that “research is needed to
address issues of accuracy, reliability, and validity in the forensic
science disciplines” (p. 190).
Perhaps due to the NAS report and other recent reform efforts,
some forensic science disciplines have begun to publish research
that sheds light on error rates. A primary example is latent print
analysis. The 2016 PCAST report noted that, “In response to the
2009 NRC report, the latent print analysis field has made progress
in recognizing the need to perform empirical studies to assess
foundational validity and measure reliability” (p. 87–88). However,
despite the progress toward establishing error rates for latent print
analysis, the report also said,
Remarkably, there have been only two black-box studies that
were intentionally and appropriately designed to assess validity
and reliability—the first published by the FBI Laboratory in
2011 [Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia, & Roberts, 2011]; the second
completed in 2014 but not yet published [Pacheco, Cerchiai, &
Stoiloff [12]]. Conclusions about foundational validity thus
must rest on these two recent studies. (p. 91)1
After reviewing all available literature, the PCAST report
ultimately concluded that the “best estimates” of false positive
error rates in latent print examinations are 1 in 604 cases (with an
upper bound of 1 in 306) and 1 in 24 (with an upper bound of 1 in
18), derived from the 2011 FBI study and the 2014 Miami-Dade
study, respectively.
For the most part, there has been similarly scarce published
research on error rates in other forensic science disciplines. For
example, the 2016 PCAST report identified only one appropriately
designed study regarding firearm analysis (i.e., an unpublished
report to the Federal government completed by the Ames
Laboratory; [13]), noting that the rate of false positive errors
was estimated to be 1 in 66, with an upper bound of 1 in 46. Studies
examining error rates in handwriting analysis have typically
suggested that analysts offer erroneous conclusions approximately
40% of the time, although error rates vary widely [14]. Few studies
have examined the accuracy of bitemark analysis but the scant
research shows similarly high error rates, with 64% of analysts
making a false positive error and 22% of examiners making a false
negative error across four cases in one study [14]. As a result,
several experts have concluded that analysts are currently unable
to reliably identify or exclude a suspect based on bitemark analysis
[15]. Finally, the error rate among identification conclusions in
microscopic hair comparisons was 11% when using DNA analysis
results to determine accuracy [16]. The above studies were
ultimately published, though other studies, with less favorable
results, have not made their way to the public domain and remain
unpublished.
In summary, few published studies have attempted to estimate
error rates in various forensic science disciplines and, among those
that do, poor ecological validity severely limits the generalizability
of results because such studies do not typically resemble “real-
world” casework. Nevertheless, this slim published research base
indicates that many forensic analysts could, at least in theory,
identify at least one published study in their discipline that
presents some estimate of error rates. Error rates depend on the
validity (i.e., accuracy) of their scientific procedures, but more
basically they depend on the reliability (i.e., consistency, repro-
ducibility) of their results [17]. With respect to reliability, two of
the more robust forensic domains show concerning data. Finger-
print data suggests a lack of reliability in 10% of conclusions. In
other words, the same examiner, looking at the same pair of
fingermarks, will reach a different conclusion 10% of the time [18].
A past study examining the reliability of DNA analyses showed
some inconsistency in conclusions [19], and this has recently been
replicated by a number of studies showing great variability in DNA
results when analyzing the same sample (e.g., some included
alleles that were absent, others neglected alleles that were
present) further indicating that errors in DNA do exist [20–22].
Although DNA analysis is widely regarded as the prevailing
standard of forensic science [3], “we do not know any more about
human or laboratory error rates in DNA cases than we know about
human or laboratory error rates in cases that employ other forensic
science techniques” ([23], p. 3). Sweden's forensic laboratory
described general rates of “contamination” and DNA laboratory
failures such as lost samples or instrument-related faults, but their
data do not speak to error rates in erroneous conclusions [24]. The
Netherlands Forensic Institute also reported general DNA labora-
tory error rates (e.g., contamination, technical errors, sample mix-
ups) and found that such errors were infrequent (i.e., less than 1%
of all analyses) and often involved human error [25]. Furthermore,
analysts may overstate the certainty of their findings or the rarity
of error. Nevertheless, there continues to be a lack of published
data detailing the rate of erroneous conclusions in DNA analyses or
any other forensic science analyses.
2. Types of error
When discussing error in forensic science conclusions, it is
important to distinguish between three types of error. Analysts can
ultimately conclude that the results of their analysis suggest an
identification or match between two sources (e.g., a latent print
originated from same source as a known print), that the results
suggest an exclusion (e.g., a latent print did not originate from
same source as a known print), or that the results are inconclusive
(e.g., that the clarity of the fingermarks, the quantity and quality of
information, does not permit an identification or an exclusion
decision). As depicted in Table 1, a true positive occurs when
analysts correctly offer an identification, a true negative occurs
when analysts correctly exclude a source, and a true inconclusive
occurs when there is not enough information to draw any other
conclusion. A false positive error occurs if an analyst concludes a
match between two items when, in fact, they originated from
different sources. Conversely, a false negative error occurs if an
analyst concludes that the fingermarks cannot have come from the
same source, when, in fact, they came from the same source. Lastly,
a false inconclusive error occurs if an analyst concludes inconclu-
sive, when there is actually sufficient information to conclude an
identification or exclusion [26].
The consequences of false positive and false negative errors
vary significantly according to the context of the decision-making
process, a calculation labeled the payoff matrix [27]. For example, in
1 “By a “black-box study,” we mean an empirical study that assesses a subjective
method by having examiners analyze samples and render opinions about the origin
or similarity of samples” (PCAST [4], p. 48). For further detail on black-box studies
and the reasons these are crucial to gauging validity, see the PCAST [4] report in full.
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smoke detectors, false positive errors (i.e., an alarm sounding when
there is no smoke) are associated with more minor consequences
than are false negative errors (i.e., an alarm does not sound in
the presence of smoke). In the criminal investigation process, the
reverse is often true. A false positive error in forensic science
conclusions typically results in criminal charges against an
innocent individual whereas false negative errors result in guilty
individuals avoiding legal charges. Determining which type of
error is more problematic presents a moral judgment with no
objective answer. However, most analysts work in an environment
that considers false positive errors worse than false negative errors
[28]. Indeed, some scholars assert that analysts should explicitly
lean towards minimizing false positive errors as the United States
criminal justice system values human life and freedom [29].
Within many forensic domains, inconclusive decisions are not even
regarded as errors, and therefore are a very attractive option for
many forensic analysts [26].
3. Do proficiency tests provide “known error rates”?
Forensic analysts’ performance on proficiency tests are some-
times cited as revealing error rates in routine casework, perhaps
because they can be examined for agreement or disagreement. For
example, approximately 12% of latent print examiners who
completed and submitted one of the seven prior Collaborative
Testing Services (CTS) proficiency tests dating back to 2014 did
not correctly identify all latent prints on the exam.2 These data
suggest that examiners do not universally agree on all conclusions,
contrary to some examiners’ assertions [30]. However, the
providers of proficiency testing emphasize that test results should
not be considered “error rates.” For example, on the front page of
all summary reports, CTS [31] states:
This report contains the data received from the participants in
this test. Since these participants are located in many countries
around the world, and it is their option how the samples are to
be used (e.g., training exercise, known or blind proficiency
testing, research and development of new techniques, etc.), the
results compiled in the Summary Report are not intended to be
an overview of the quality of work performed in the profession
and cannot be interpreted as such . . . These comments are not
intended to reflect the general state of the art within the
profession. (p. 1)
Furthermore, as currently implemented, there are several
important differences between proficiency testing and real-world
casework. Forensic analysts are distinctly aware that they are being
tested; it is unclear whether most respondents work alone, in
groups, or under close supervision while completing proficiency
tests. Further, some have argued that proficiency testing in latent
print examination may be unrealistically simple and may not
adequately simulate actual casework (e.g., [8,23]). Some scholars
have thus called for a revision of the proficiency testing process to
allow for calculation of actual error rates [32]. Currently, however,
it is likely that proficiency testing only informs estimates of the
lower bounds of error rates in routine casework because
“laboratory technicians can take special care when they know
they are dealing with test samples” ([8,33], p. 447).
4. Public perception of forensic science accuracy and error rates
Of course, the sparse empirical data examining forensic science
error rates does not preclude opinions regarding the accuracy of
forensic science techniques. Several studies have explored public
perception of errors and reliability in forensic science, with varied
results. Lieberman et al. [34] found that undergraduate students
and former jurors provided accuracy estimates for various forensic
science techniques ranging from 78% (“alcohol and drug tests”) to
95% (DNA evidence). In contrast, a recent survey of Australian
community members revealed high estimates of the chances of an
error occurring during forensic science testing (M = 39% chance of
error) and analysis (M = 45%; [35]). Regarding latent print analyses
specifically, another study found that 20% of laypersons believed
fingerprint evidence was “somewhat reliable,” 51% believed such
evidence was “reliable,” and 26% believed such evidence was “very
reliable” [36]. The same study also surveyed defense attorneys,
who were more skeptical: only 39% believed fingerprint evidence
to be “somewhat reliable,” 23% viewed such evidence as “reliable,”
and only 6% viewed such evidence as “very reliable.”
There is little research examining beliefs about how often false
positive and false negative errors occur within forensic science
analyses. Members of a jury pool estimated the false positive error
rate in DNA analyses to be one in one million, but the researchers
did not ask participants to estimate the prevalence of false negative
errors [37]. Similarly, Koehler [23] asked jury-eligible community
members to estimate the false positive rate in five forensic science
disciplines using a 14-level logarithmic scale. Participants’ median
estimates were all very low, with average responses ranging from
1 in 10 million for DNA analyses, 1 in 5.5 million for latent print
analyses, 1 in 1 million for bitemark analysis and microscopic hair
analysis, and 1 in 100,000 for handwriting analysis.
Taken together, the limited literature suggests that laypersons
and lawyers perceive that forensic science analyses are prone to
error and that error rates vary by analysis type, but also that people
vary in their perceptions regarding how often such errors occur.
Moreover, there is very little information regarding perceptions of
false negative error rates in forensic science analyses. Most
importantly, none of the existing research includes the forensic
examiners themselves.
5. Statement of purpose
We do not know how often forensic science analysts arrive at
erroneous conclusions in their casework. Furthermore, we know
very little about how forensic analysts approach and estimate error
in their discipline. Research reveals that laypersons and lawyers
hold varied beliefs regarding the accuracy of forensic science
techniques, but no study has examined the opinions of those who
actually conduct such analyses and communicate the results: i.e.,
the forensic analysts.
It is especially important to explore what forensic analysts think
about error rates. First, the forensic analysts are those who
communicate their results to the fact finder (e.g., in court to the
jurors or judge, or earlier in the process, to investigators and
attorneys). Hence, it is important to understand what analysts
Table 1
Error types in forensic science conclusions.a
Analyst's conclusion Ground truth
Identification
(Same source)
Exclusion
(Different source)
Identification Correct identification
(True Positive)
False Positive
Exclusion False Negative Correct Exclusion
(True Negative)
Inconclusive False Inconclusive False Inconclusive
a Assuming that there is sufficient information in the fingermarks to make an
identification or exclusion decision. If there is insufficient information to reach such
conclusions, then all decisions, except inconclusive, are erroneous.
2 Data available at: https://cts-forensics.com/program-4.php. CTS proficiency
exams typically comprise 11 or 12 latent prints.
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consider their error rates to be, as this clearly determines how they
communicate their results. Second, changes and improvements in
forensic science can only be motivated by acknowledging errors; if
a domain is considered error-free, then the motivation to change or
improve is minimal. The present study is the first to examine the
perception of error rates among forensic analysts themselves.
The present study explored forensic analysts’ estimates of error
rates in their disciplines and whether demographic characteristics
(e.g., age, gender) influenced such perceptions. This study also
investigated how forensic analysts weigh the risk of false positive
and false negative errors in their work. Understanding whether
examiners adopt a more conservative or liberal decision criterion
when making conclusions, and whether this is consistent across
examiners and laboratories, has the potential to inform training
and promote reliability across examiners. Finally, this study asked
forensic analysts how they knew the “known error rates” in their
disciplines, that is, where they believed error rates to be published
or otherwise available. This final question is important because
legal standards of admissibility (e.g., [1]) advise judges to consider
the “known or potential rate of an error” and forensic analysts are
typically responsible for communicating conclusions and infor-
mation about error rates to the court.
6. Method
6.1. Participants
Participants were 189 practicing forensic analysts within the
United States. We removed six participants from analyses due to
either unintelligible and/or incomplete responses on the survey
(n = 2), or because they identified a discipline outside of forensic
science (e.g., administration, “police officer”; n = 4). Thus, our final
sample comprised 183 forensic analysts. Most participants were
women (n = 118, 65%) and their average age was 39 years (SD = 8.9;
range = 24 to 74). Most participants described themselves as
Caucasian (n = 96; 53%) or Asian/Pacific Islander (n = 44; 24%), with
fewer endorsing Hispanic/Latino (n = 19; 10%), African American
(n = 4; 2%), or unspecified (n = 2; 1%) ethnicities. Other participants
identified as Multiracial (n = 6; 3%) or declined to provide an
ethnicity (n = 12; 6%).
Of participants who responded to the demographics survey, the
vast majority held a Master's degree (n = 86; 49%) or Bachelor's
degree (n = 76; 43%). Few participants held a doctoral degree (n = 9;
5%) or completed less than three years of college (n = 4; 2%).
Regarding work experience, participants typically reported work-
ing 9.9 years (Mdn = 8; SD = 7.4; range = 0.5 to 34) in their primary
discipline.
Participants endorsed a variety of forensic science disciplines.
To facilitate comparisons among disciplines, we categorized
participants according to four broad disciplines that were included
in analyses: Biology (n = 84; 46%), Pattern Evidence (i.e., latent
print analysis, firearm and tool mark analysis, questioned docu-
ments, and trace evidence; n = 43; 24%), Chemistry (i.e., forensic,
drug, and environmental chemistry, toxicology; n = 32; 18%), and
Crime Scene Investigation (n = 12; 7%).3 We categorized a small
subset of participants’ primary discipline as other (e.g., environ-
mental forensics, anthropology; n = 6; 3%) and some participants
did not identify a primary discipline (n = 6; 3%). More than one
third of participants (n = 73; 40%) endorsed multiple disciplines
within forensic science and, of these participants, most identified
crime scene investigation (n = 38; 52%) as an ancillary discipline.
6.2. Measures
6.2.1. Procedure
Participants completed a three-part survey addressing topics
relating to (1) attitudes regarding the acceptability of error types,
(2) estimates of error rates within forensic science, and
(3) perceptions of task relevance regarding available case
information. For the current study, we present results from the
first two parts of the survey (for additional detail regarding part
three, see Ref. [42]). Before asking questions about perceptions or
estimates, the survey provided a brief education on false positive
and false negative errors. We defined false positive errors as “the
error of determining that evidence does support a match or
identification, when a match or identification does not truly exist,”
and false negative errors as “the error of determining that evidence
does not support a match or identification, when a match or
identification truly does exist.”
6.2.2. Survey
In part one of the survey, participants indicated how they
“weigh and prioritize the risk of each type of error” on an 11-point
scale ranging from 0 = I minimize the risk of false positives, and
therefore tolerate greater risk of false negatives, to 10 = I minimize the
risk of false negative, and therefore tolerate greater risk of false
positives. The midpoint of the scale (i.e., 5) noted, I accept equal risk
of false positives and false negatives. Participants then completed
similar questions indicating how they believed their laboratory,
and discipline as a whole, weigh and prioritize the risk of each type
of error.
In part two of the survey, we asked participants to provide
separate estimates of the false positive and false negative error
rates in their discipline. We used the logarithmic scale first
published by Thompson and colleagues [37] and later used by
other researchers (e.g., [23]) to provide participants with 14
possible error rates ranging from “approximately 1 time in 2,” to
“such an error is impossible.” After estimating the error rates in
their discipline, participants were asked where the error rates
for their discipline were published or documented. They could
either identify a source for their error rate estimates or indicate
that they did not know of any source documenting known error
rates in their discipline.
6.2.3. Demographics form
A standard demographics form asked for participant age,
gender, and ethnicity. We also asked participants to identify their
primary discipline, as well as any ancillary disciplines. Additional-
ly, the form asked participants to indicate how many years they
had worked in their primary discipline and their highest
educational degree.
7. Results
7.1. Analysis strategy
We used SPSS (version 24) to perform all analyses. We assessed
participants’ perceptions of error rates using a 14-point scale with
responses ranging from “approximately 1 time in 2” (coded as 1 for
analyses) to “such an error is impossible” (coded as 14 for analyses).
Thus, higher scores on this variable indicated lower estimates of
error rates. We used non-parametric analyses (i.e., Spearman's r)
to treat this variable as ordinal because the data were not equally
distributed. We similarly used non-parametric analyses (i.e., chi
square test of independence) to evaluate potential differences
3 We could not obtain comparison data detailing the disciplines or demographics
of forensic analysts within crime laboratories. However, the most recent census of
publicly funded crime laboratories in the United States [41] indicates that analyses
relating to controlled substances (81% of all laboratories), latent prints (63%), and
biology (62%) are the most common among crime laboratories.
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between participants who provided a source for their error rate
estimates and those who did not on categorical variables (e.g.,
discipline). Finally, we used parametric analyses to evaluate the
association between participants’ ratings of the acceptability of
error types and other variables of interest. Specifically, we
conducted a mixed-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) to assess
whether participant ratings differed according to primary disci-
pline and ratings subject (i.e., self, workplace, discipline). We also
conducted Pearson product-moment correlations to assess the
association between participant ratings and other continuous
variables such as years of work experience.
7.2. Estimated error rates
Overall, participants estimated that false positive errors were
less frequent than false negative errors in their respective
disciplines, although estimates of false positive and negative
errors were highly correlated (Spearman's r [116] = .67, p < .001).
Analysts most commonly estimated that false positives errors
occurred at a rate of 1 in 10,000 and that false negative errors
occurred at a rate of 1 in 100. Approximately half of analysts
(n = 60; 50%) indicated that the rate of false positive errors fell
between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 1,000,000. However, 38% of analysts
(n = 46) indicated that the rate of false positive errors was equal to,
or less than, 1 in one billion. Moreover, 10% of analysts (n = 12)
stated that false positive errors were not possible.
Regarding false negative errors, half of analysts (n = 60; 50%)
indicated that the rate of false positive errors fell between 1 in 100
and 1 in 10,000. Almost one quarter of analysts (n = 26; 22%)
indicated that the rate of false negative errors was equal to, or less
than, 1 in one billion. Additionally, 6% of analysts (n = 7) stated that
false negative errors were not possible.
Participant estimates of error rates varied according to their
primary discipline. As shown in Fig. 1, analysts in forensic biology
generally provided lower errors rates than did analysts in other
disciplines, such as pattern evidence. However, there was signifi-
cant variability within all disciplines, with estimates for identical
error types sometimes ranging from as high as “1 in 2,” to as low as
“less than 1 in quadrillion.”
Interestingly, older analysts estimated that both false positive
(r[111] = .28, p = .003) and false negative (r[110] = .28, p = .003)
errors occurred more frequently than did younger analysts. This
pattern may be partially explained by age differences among
forensic disciplines. Specifically, the average age of forensic bio-
logists (who generally provided lower error estimates) was 37.4
(SD = 6.7) whereas pattern evidence analysts were typically 41.2
Fig. 1. Estimated error rates within primary discipline.
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years old (SD = 9.9). Although the trend persisted, the association
between analyst age and error rate estimates was not significant
solely among forensic biologists or chemists. Older analysts in
pattern evidence provided higher estimates of false negative errors
(r[30] = .42, p = .02) but not false positive errors (r[30] = .30,
p = .10).
7.2.1. Source of error rate estimates
When asked to provide a source4 for their estimated error rates,
most analysts (n = 144; 78.7%) were not able to provide a source.
Among the minority who provided a source, 46.2% (n = 18) of
analysts cited their personal work or training experiences as
evidence for their estimated errors rates. Fewer analysts (n = 12;
30.8% of those who provided any source) referenced a scientific
journal or study, whereas 10.3% (n = 4) cited proficiency testing
data (e.g., CTS examinations). An additional 12.8% (n = 5) of analysts
reported a personal belief as justification for their error rate
estimations (e.g., “I just believe not enough labs take appropriate
QA measures when it comes to exclusions/inconclusives”) or
described laboratory procedures. In total, three quarters (75.3%) of
analysts who directly responded to our source questions, and two-
thirds (66.7%) of all surveyed analysts, explicitly indicated that
they did not know of a source for error rates in their discipline.
The proportion of analysts who explicitly indicated that they
were unaware of an error rate source varied significantly by
discipline, χ2 (3, N = 153) = 9.13, p = .03. As demonstrated in Fig. 2, of
analysts who responded, more biologists (85.7%) indicated that
they were unaware of a source for error rates than did other
disciplines (63.2–77.8%). Moreover, female analysts (81.0%) were
more likely to indicate that they were unaware of an error rate
source than were male analysts (64.2%), χ2 (1, N = 158) = 5.35,
p = .02, though (as detailed earlier) the sources male analysts
referenced were often nonspecific.
7.3. Attitudes regarding the acceptability of error types
Overall, analysts indicated that they (M = 3.48; SD = 2.22), their
workplace (M = 3.57; SD = 2.33), and their discipline (M = 3.62;
SD = 2.22) preferred to minimize the risk of false positive errors and
therefore tolerated a greater risk of false negative errors. However,
there was substantial variability in attitudes toward error types as
evidenced by the relatively high standard deviations and responses
ranging from 0 = I minimize the risk of false positives, and therefore
tolerate greater risk of false negatives, to 10 = I minimize the risk of
false negative, and therefore tolerate greater risk of false positives.
We conducted a 3 (Subject: self, workplace, discipline)  4
(Primary discipline: biology, crime scene investigation, chemistry,
pattern evidence) mixed-factor ANOVA to assess (1) whether
analysts described their personal attitudes as different from the
attitudes held by their workplace and discipline, and (2) whether
analysts’ attitudes regarding error types varied according to their
primary discipline. Analysts did not describe their attitudes as
different than the attitudes held by their workplace or discipline,
F(2, 310) = 0.30, p = .75, h2p ¼ :002. However, the between-subjects
effect of primary discipline on analyst attitudes approached
significance, F(3, 155) = 2.53, p = .06, h2p ¼ :05. More specifically,
crime scene investigators endorsed a stronger preference to
minimize the risk of false negative errors than did analysts from all
other disciplines, F(3, 162) = 3.73, p = .01, h2p ¼ :07 (a finding that
seems to reflect the different duties of each discipline). Thus,
although analysts from different disciplines did not perceive their
workplaces or disciplines as having contrasting attitudes regarding
the acceptability of error types, crime scene investigators endorsed
a stronger personal preference to minimize false negative errors
and therefore tolerated a greater risk of false positive errors than
did other disciplines. Fig. 3 reports analysts’ average attitudes
regarding error acceptability according to their primary discipline.
There were no significant attitudinal differences between male
and female analysts, and analyst age was unrelated to reported
attitudes.5 Analyst age and work experience are highly correlated
constructs but are not redundant; almost half of the variance in one
variable is not explained by the other (r[165] = .74, p < .001).
Further, unlike age, work experience was unrelated to analyst
gender or primary discipline in the current sample. Analysts with
greater work experience expressed a greater preference to
minimize false positive errors and therefore tolerate a greater
Fig. 2. Percentage of analysts explicitly indicating unawareness of error rate source
within primary discipline.
Fig. 3. Attitudes regarding the acceptability of error types. * denotes value is
significantly different from other values depicted in same-colored bars at p < .05.
4 The exact question was: “What is the basis of your reported error rates in
questions 1 and 2? Please be as specific as possible (i.e., if your response comes from
a specific publication or document, please identify that publication or document).
Imagine that you were being asked this question in court and had to convey to the
court exactly what source of information you used.”
5 Although not significant, male analysts reported a stronger preference to
minimize the risk of false positives (M = 3.0; SD = 2.2) than did female analysts
(M = 3.7; SD = 2.2; p = .053; d = .32). They did not differ in their perceptions of their
workplace and discipline's efforts to prevent false positive/negatives. Perhaps
relatedly (as men were older than women in the current sample), an insignificant
trend emerged in which older analysts emphasized the minimization of false
positive errors, r(164) = -.14, p = .07.
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risk of false negative errors in their work (r[164] = .23, p = .003).
Those with more work experience also believed that their lab
(r[167] = .19, p = .01) and discipline (r[161] = .19, p = .02) placed a
greater emphasis on minimizing the risk of false positive errors.
8. Discussion
Although forensic science disciplines do not have well-
established error rates [23], the few studies that have been
published present widely divergent error rates across forensic
science disciplines, with false positive error rates ranging from 0.1%
in latent fingerprint analyses [38] to 64.0% in bitemark analyses
[14]. False negative error rates in these studies are similarly wide-
ranging, with estimates ranging from 7.5% (latent fingerprint
analyses) to 22% (bitemark analyses). The current findings are the
first to explore what the forensic analysts themselves believe about
error rates in their field. Analysts most commonly estimated that
false positive errors occurred at a rate of 1 in 10,000 (i.e., a 0.01%
error rate) and that false negative errors occurred at a rate of 1 in
100 (i.e., a 1.0% error rate). These rates appear lower than even the
smallest error rates reported in the literature. Further, more than
one in five examiners estimated the risk of each type of error to be
impossible or extremely low (i.e., equal to or less than 1 in one
billion). This is concerning in light of (a) the inevitability of error in
human decision making, (b) human vulnerability to cognitive bias,
and (c) the small body of available empirical research suggesting
actual error rates are likely much higher (all factors emphasized in
the landmark reviews of forensic sciences in the U.S. [3,4]).
Daubert et al. [1] governs admissibility decisions in many
jurisdictions and explicitly advises judges to consider the “known
or potential rate of an error” when admitting a particular technique
as evidence. However, analysts provided widely divergent
estimates of error in their fields – with some estimates impossibly
low – and most analysts could not identify where error rates for
their discipline were published or otherwise available. Indeed,
among the minority of analysts who did identify a source (21.3% of
analysts surveyed), most cited personal experiences or beliefs
(59.0%) as opposed to scientific publications or studies. Put
differently, of all analysts that were asked to provide a source for
their estimated error rates, only 6.6% made any reference to a
scientific journal or study. Forensic analysts are responsible for
conducting scientific analyses and communicating subsequent
conclusions; they are usually the expert expected to convey
information about error rates to the court. But in our sample, less
than 7% could provide the kind of error rate information that many
standards of legal admissibility (e.g., Daubert) require.
8.1. Analyst vs. layperson error estimates
Fig. 1 suggests that analyst opinions varied widely, such that
they do not hold a consensus view of error rates in their disciplines.
Koehler [23] used an identical response scale to ask jury-eligible
laypersons what they believed about the false positive error rates
in various forensic science techniques. Whereas he found that
laypersons gave a median estimate of a 1-in-10-million false
positive error rate for DNA analyses, the forensic biology analysts in
the present study typically estimated a 1-in-100-million false
positive error rate. Similarly, laypersons estimated a 1-in-5.5-
million error rate for latent print analyses while the seven latent
print analysts who provided responses in this study gave a much
lower median false positive error rate: 1 in 1 billion. Koehler's [23]
findings suggested that laypersons were quite optimistic in
estimating the accuracy of forensic science techniques. But, by
our comparisons, those laypersons shared less optimistic (and
more accurate, according to the limited data available) perceptions
of error rates than the analysts we studied, who actually perform
the techniques and conveyed even more optimistic estimates of
exceedingly low error rates.
8.2. Attitudes regarding error types
In general, analysts reported that they, their workplace, and
their discipline prefer to minimize the risk of false positive errors
and thus tolerate a greater risk of false negative errors. Similarly,
analysts’ error rate estimates also indicated a belief that false
positive errors are less prevalent than false negative errors across
disciplines. These findings are consistent with scholars asserting
that analysts tend to minimize false positive errors in their work
[28,29]. Ulery and colleagues [38] also noted that more informa-
tion is typically required to conclude that two items do originate
from the same source than to conclude two items do not originate
from the same source, thus making false positive conclusions rarer
than false negative conclusions.
More experienced analysts reported an even greater preference
to minimize false positive errors. Approximately 5% of the variance
in personal attitudes regarding error acceptability can be explained
by years of work experience, a small-to-moderate effect. Perhaps
extended exposure to work environments that warn false positive
errors are more serious than false negative errors [28] influence
analyst attitudes over time. Additionally, or alternatively, perhaps
extended experience with a criminal justice system that expresses
an explicit preference to avoid false positive errors pulls analysts to
minimize such errors. In any case, it appears that analysts
become slightly more conservative in their approach to error
with experience.
Finally, crime scene investigators appeared distinct from other
disciplines in their attitudes toward the acceptability of error
types. They held a more balanced view regarding errors than
other disciplines and their responses typically indicated that they
accepted equal risk of false positive and false negative errors. This
distinction does not appear surprising given crime scene inves-
tigators’ tendency to consider more information relevant to their
analyses than other disciplines [42]. Moreover, they often conduct
analyses earlier in the investigation process, when identifying
potential suspects may be equally important to excluding innocent
individuals. Crime scene investigators may also rely on different
decision rules than other analysts, or have access to additional
information that differentially informs similar decision rules. For
example, where some analysts may prefer to make decisions that
minimize the maximum loss scenario (e.g., avoid incriminating
the innocent), others may rely more heavily on the probabilities
associated with specific outcomes (for a detailed discussion of
forensic identification decision making, see [39]). Alternatively,
two analysts may hold similar decision rules, but one may have
access to additional information (i.e., less uncertainty) in the
decision making process that influences behavioral tendencies.
In sum, crime scene investigators may hold different beliefs
regarding the perceived consequences and probabilities of
erroneous decisions, but they may also have additional informa-
tion that informs their decision-making compared to other
analysts.
8.3. Limitations
There are several limitations when considering results. As
Koehler [8] stated, “there is no agreed-upon answer to what counts
as an error” (p. 1080). Although we provided explicit definitions of
false positive and false negative errors, it is possible that some
amount of the variability in analyst opinions can be explained by
differences in what they consider an error. For example, some
analysts may disagree regarding whether incorrect inconclusive
opinions (e.g., an analyst gives an inconclusive determination
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when the two items actually did result from the same source)
constitute formal errors. There are also multiple methods to
calculate and report error rates; thus, it is important to ensure
results describe comparable statistics procedures before contrast-
ing error rates reported in the literature.
A strength of this study was that participants were actual
forensic examiners and that they came from several different
disciplines. However, a weakness of the study was that we did not
have particularly large samples from any single discipline, making
it difficult to assess differences among disciplines, or to generalize
results to a particular sub-discipline within forensic science. Many
analysts in the current study indicated that they worked in forensic
science disciplines beyond their primary discipline. It is possible
that participation in multiple disciplines influences analyst beliefs
and attitudes such that those with varied backgrounds approach
error differently than those with experience only in one discipline.
Finally, accurately describing attitudes and decision-making
criteria can be difficult because these processes often occur
without our complete awareness (e.g., [40]). Analysts who express
a preference to minimize false positive errors may, in practice,
make more balanced conclusions. Follow-up research examining
analyst beliefs, and patterns in actual conclusions, across
additional forensic science disciplines would shed further light
on this important area of study.
9. Conclusion
No forensic science discipline has well-established error rates
(disciplines are beginning to examine error rates, but some of these
data are not published). Nevertheless, people hold intuitive
opinions about the accuracy of forensic techniques, and these
opinions are used to make important legal decisions. Most analysts
expressed a preference to minimize false positive errors and,
likewise, estimated false positive errors to be less common than
false negative errors. However, they varied considerably in their
estimates. A significant number of analysts provided unrealistically
low estimates, and the vast majority of analysts could not identify a
source from which they knew estimated rates of error. Overall,
results highlight the need for further work investigating and
disseminating error rates as a step toward improving forensic
science, as well as informing policy and practice, guarding against
overconfidence, and complying with legal standards for the
admissibility of scientific evidence.
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